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ABSTRACT
Consumers and businesses have attempted to use the common
law of torts as well as federal statutes like the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act, the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and
Transactional Records Act, and the Wiretap Act to address the
expanding problem of spyware. Spyware, which consists of
software applications inserted into another’s computer to report a
user’s activity to an outsider, is as innocuous as tracking purchases
or as sinister as stealing trade secrets or an individual’s identity.
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Existing law does not address spyware adequately because
authorization language, buried in “click-through” boilerplate,
renders much of current law useless. Congress must act to make
spyware companies disclose their intentions with conspicuous and
clearly-stated warnings.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
The law of the United States specifically addresses espionage,
whether through the theft of government information 4 or, as the law also
contemplates industrial espionage, through stealing trade secrets or
patentable information. 5 But, what of the theft of other types of information
from individuals’ or business’ computers? Most people are familiar with
spyware’s ability to infect computers and to record browsing habits,
keystrokes, passwords, financial information, and other personal
identification and to transmit it without the computer owner’s knowledge. 6
Unfortunately for the person whose computer has been hijacked and whose
information is being stolen, the law does not adequately address these types
of spies, that is, spyware.

The law has not developed to address spyware because spyware is a
relatively recent phenomenon, a phenomenon that is really an extension of
cookie technology. 7 The problem is compounded by the fact that end-users
connected to the World Wide Web (“Web”) either intentionally or
unintentionally invite others into their machines. This article describes
spyware, 8 considers current efforts used to control spyware, and then
proposes a solution that avoids crippling businesses that legitimately rely
upon cookies while protecting businesses and consumers from illegitimate
spyware.
¶2

I. THE EVIL GHOST IN THE MACHINE
¶3
Understanding spyware requires the realization that any connection
to a site on the Web is not passive and the visitor does not wander around
invisibly. Connecting to the Web is not like opening a book in the library
and looking at its contents. While the person accessing the Web is
gathering information from the site, the site knows the visitor is there, is
4

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 792-799 (2000).
See, e.g., Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. AG, 330 F. Supp. 2d 679, 692-93
(E.D. Va. 2004).
6
See generally Merrill Warkentin, Xin Luo, & Gary F. Templeton, A
Framework for Spyware Assessment, 48 COMM. OF THE ACM 8 (Aug. 2005).
7
See, e.g., Andrew Brandt, How it Works: Cookies, Feb. 22, 2000 (explaining
how a cookie works),
http://www.pcworld.com/hereshow/article/0,aid,15352,00.asp.
8
For a complete description of spyware, see Warkentin, supra note 6.
5
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monitoring the visitor’s actions and has varying levels of access, by the
visitor’s invitation, to that visitor’s computer. One of the earliest forms of
this active interaction was cookie technology. 9 Cookies are beneficial
because they “[e]liminate[] the need to repeatedly fill out order forms or reregister on Web sites.” 10 For instance, with passwords being increasingly
difficult to remember, some sites that require user names and passwords
place cookies on the hard drive so that the user has the option to log-in
automatically when visiting. 11 Web-based businesses like cookies because
they can use them to track “Web surfing behavior or patterns.” 12
Businesses can target their advertising and show users products of interest
based on past purchases. 13 Businesses, however, always seeking more
competitive advantages, have developed a variety of legitimate and
illegitimate technologies to enhance their market advantage. 14
Adware, a cookie modification, 15 places either random or targeted
advertisements on the screen of the user. 16 Generally, adware is not
malicious. 17 Spyware, while similar to adware, is usually an application
¶4

9

A website uses cookies to record "bits of identifying information on your hard
drive, which the sites can use to track your activities and recognize you when
you return." Brandt, supra note 7. "For some, [cookies] promise a more userfriendly Web; for others, they pose a privacy threat." Id.
10
See id.
11
For instance, the New York Times requires registration which is free, and its
cookie logs the users into the site each time they visit. Id. Of course, users must
beware to use this option only when confident that anyone with access to the
hardware is authorized to visit the site.
12
Id.
13
For instance, Amazon.com updates its page view depending upon who is
looking and that person’s purchase history. Id.
14
For a list of the various applications, see Lavasoft, Spyware & Harmful
Technologies, http://www.lavasoftusa.com/trackware_info/spyware_tech (last
visited Sept. 19, 2005). Such tools as data miners that actively collect
information, dialers that change the computers dial-up networking, worms that
create self-replicating viruses, and hijackers that hijack a user’s home page are
all examples of modifications of cookie technology. Id.
15
For the difference between adware and spyware, see Webopedia, Spyware,
http://www.webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/internet/2004/spyware.asp (last
visited Sept. 19, 2005).
16
Id. Many times these advertisements appear on the web page being visited;
however, sometimes they appear as “pop-ups” superimposing themselves on the
page being visited or as “pop-unders” so they appear on the users screen after
closing the particular web page or closing other applications. Pop-unders, while
not as annoying at the time they appear, can be more problematic because they
may contain animations that cause the entire system to run more slowly for no
apparent reason.
17
Id.
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installed on the user’s computer, and, by definition, installed without the
user’s knowledge. Spyware can monitor everything users do with their
machines, not only their activities on the Web, and transmit that information
to an outside entity. 18 Unfortunately, users mostly accept spyware
unintentionally or without full and informed knowledge of its parameters
when downloading something from the Web. The spyware company
usually claims users consented to the installation of spyware by accepting a
licensing agreement. 19 Typically, a user merely “clicks through” boilerplate
without reading it. 20
¶5
The most glaring problem for both businesses and the courts is to
walk the fine line between two regulatory strategies: shutting down
spyware that, collects and uses end users’ information without first
obtaining full, informed consent; or eliminating the ability of businesses to
employ target advertising and simultaneously making it more difficult for
consumers to conduct business with their computers. For instance, the
government could outlaw any type of cookie technology on the Web.
Although this would solve the problem of spyware, the end-result would
cripple Internet businesses. Alternately, authorities could continue forcing
consumers and businesses to apply the ineffective existing law. The
balance of this iBrief describes the methods tried in the past, mostly without
success, and posits a potential solution.

II. TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW THEORIES
¶6
Victims of spyware have attempted to use two different traditional
common law theories to address spyware: trespass to chattels; 21 and
intrusion upon seclusion. 22 While consumers have attained some success
with each of these theories, courts are inconsistent in the rules applicable to

18

Id. "Because spyware exists as independent executable programs, they have
the capability to monitor your key strokes, scan files on the hard drive, snoop
other applications, such as chat programs or word processors, install other
spyware programs, read cookies, change the default home page on the Web
browser, while consistently relaying this information back to the spyware author
who will either use it for advertising and marketing purposes or sell the
information to another party." Id.
19
This is the fundamental problem with enforcement under the current legal
theories, as discussed more fully below with respect to each of the potential
existing solutions. See infra notes 57-62, 69-73 and accompanying text.
20
Id. One of the authors is willing to admit that he “clicks through” without
reading the terse and incomprehensible terms. He suspects the vast majority of
readers do also.
21
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965) (describing trespass to
chattels).
22
See id. at § 652B (describing intrusion upon seclusion).
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their use. 23 Due to inconsistencies, practitioners must be very careful in
attempting to use these or other theories of common law liability to attack
spyware.

A. Trespass to Chattels
¶7
Using trespass to chattels usually requires a great deal of creativity
by the attorney and the court. One such creative application arose in
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., a case in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. 24 The litigation in Register.com arose after
the defendant, Verio, allegedly placed a computerized robot on
Register.com’s system. 25 The plaintiff claimed that the use of this robot
constituted a trespass to chattels. 26 The Second Circuit affirmed the trial
court’s holding that liability for trespass to chattels could apply in this
situation. 27 Verio argued that the robot caused no harm to Register.com’s
chattel because it did not shut the system down.28 However, the court found
that even though this robot might not incapacitate the system, this and other
robots had the potential to incapacitate the system and such potential was
sufficient for liability under the tort. 29 The Second Circuit also adopted the
trial court’s finding that the robot used significant amounts of
Register.com’s system. 30
¶8
Unfortunately, the opinion provides a mixed blessing for the
spyware victim. The court held that the terms of use on Register.com’s

23

For instance, a federal court in California has held that simply invading
someone’s computer and using it can constitute trespass to chattels. See Oyster
Software, Inc. v. Forms Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL
1736382, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2001). On the other hand, the California
Supreme Court has held that the court in Oyster Software incorrectly applied
California law and that California requires that the chattel actually be impaired
in its function for trespass to chattel to occur. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d
296, 307 n. 5 (Cal. 2003).
24
356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines
trespass to chattels in terms of someone without permission interfering with the
chattel so that it "is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or . . . [the
owner] is deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time . . . ."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218.
25
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 397. In this case, it was an automated software
program that searched Register.com’s database for contact information allegedly
to steal Register.com’s clients. Id. at 395. A robot is a software application that
automatically searches for information.
26
Id. at 396-97.
27
Id. at 404-05.
28
Id. at 404.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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website did not prohibit Verio from using a data mining system like a robot
to collect information automatically.31 The problem, of course, in implying
consent is that with consumers and others “clicking through” a boilerplate
agreement by “clicking” on a button that says “I agree with the terms,” they
may be unwittingly and without full information consenting to the
installation of spyware on their machines.
¶9
The greatest problem, however, with trespass to chattels is that the
plaintiff must show actual damage to the chattel. 32 This problem haunted
the California Supreme Court, causing it to refuse to apply California’s
common law trespass to chattels to fashion a remedy for a spyware
installation. 33 The court, not willing to accept the theory propounded by the
Second Circuit that potential damage to a system suffices, held electronic
impulses do not injure the chattel and, therefore, a claim under trespass to
chattels failed for lack of demonstrable damages. 34

B. Intrusion Upon Seclusion
¶10
The tort of intrusion upon seclusion, or violation of the right of
privacy, 35 gives spyware victims little additional help. Like trespass to
chattels and other tort theories, plaintiffs must prove the existence of
damages. Unless counsel can identify sufficient damages, the theory, while
interesting from an intellectual standpoint, provides little assistance to the
victim. Furthermore, courts frequently find other excuses for not imposing
liability under a privacy tort.

31

Id. at 437 n.56, 404–05. The trial court held that language in Register.com’s
database authorization allowed individuals to collect information automatically
but not to use automated systems with the data after it was collected.
Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The Second Circuit affirmed this holding; however, both courts found that as of
the date the lawsuit was filed, the consent was withdrawn. See id. at 249;
Register.com, 356 F.3d at 437.
32
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965); see Register.com, 356
F.3d at 437-38.
33
Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296, 308-09 (Cal. 2003).
34
The California Supreme Court contended that Oyster Software, Inc. v. Forms
Processing, Inc., No. C-00-0724 JCS, 2001 WL 1736382 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6,
2001), misapplied California law. Intel Corp., 71 P.3d at 1357 n.5. The federal
courts in California seem more likely to allow trespass to chattels. See, e.g.,
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (holding that computers are tangible personal
property and that invading them with electronic impulses constitutes to trespass
to chattels).
35
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B.
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For instance, in White v. White, 36 a New Jersey family court held
that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion could apply to the access of
computer records. 37 However, because the computer in question was
located in a common area, the court held that anyone with access to that
common area would not be subject to liability for intrusion upon
seclusion. 38 This case sends another mixed message; the tort might work,
but only if the computer is not accessible. The court specifically held that
“[a] ‘reasonable person’ cannot conclude that an intrusion is ‘highly
offensive’ when the actor intrudes into an area in which the victim has
either a limited or no expectation of privacy.” 39 The court further held that
the fact that others had access to the computer made expectations of privacy
unreasonable. 40
¶11

¶12
The spyware perpetrator might use such language from White to
justify intrusion into a computer over the Web. In White, the husband did
not know that his wife could access the contents of his computer but had left
it in a physical place where she could, in fact, access it. 41 Similarly,
individuals connecting to the Internet may not realize that the owners of
sites they access can also access their information. However, those sites can
in fact access the information, and users, like Mr. White, are leaving their
computers in an accessible place, even if it is only accessible in cyberspace.
Therefore, a spyware perpetrator could rely on this case for the proposition
that connecting a computer to the Web gives others access, and in fact,
invites others in, thereby making an expectation of privacy unreasonable.
¶13
At the other end of the spectrum, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court, in Remsburg v. Dousearch, Inc., considered the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion from the opposite point of view, holding that alleged invading
individuals must “exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm.” 42 This seemed to indicate the court was
beginning from the opposite direction from the court in White. In White, the
question was whether or not the person being invaded had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. In Remsburg, the New Hampshire court asked
whether the person doing the looking was subjecting the other to an

36

781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
Id. at 91. In that case, the husband and estranged wife were living in the same
house. Id. at 87. The wife gained access to the husband’s computer and found
e-mails between the husband and his other woman. Id. The husband mistakenly
believed that his e-mail account could only be accessed by using his password.
Id.
38
Id. at 92.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 87.
42
816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003).
37
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unreasonable risk of harm. The Remsburg court held that someone who
should realize that the conduct may create “an unreasonable risk of harm to
another has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from
occurring.” 43
¶14
Irrespective of a court’s point of view in imposing or denying
liability, the current common law fails to meet the needs of the consumer or
of businesses in addressing spyware. First, the tort of trespass to chattels is
marginally helpful because of the difficulty in establishing damage to the
chattel and the argument of implied consent. 44 Second, the tort of intrusion
upon seclusion suffers from the same difficulty in establishing damages,
focuses on consent, and depends upon whether the court’s initial position is
that the victim’s expectation of privacy is reasonable or the proposition that
the spyware perpetrator has a duty to prevent harm to the victim.

III. POTENTIONAL STATUTORY REMEDIES
¶15
Three separate federal laws are applicable in the spyware context:
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”); 45 the Stored Wire and
Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Act (“Stored
Communications Act”); 46 and the Wiretap Act. 47 Unfortunately, none of
these acts were designed to address the issues presented by spyware, and
each has significant drawbacks.

A. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)
¶16
Under the CFAA, spyware victims can assert a civil cause of action
provided they can show aggregate damages during a one-year period of at
least $5,000 in value, 48 some modification or impairment of medical
information, 49 a physical injury, 50 a threat to the public health or safety, 51 or
some damage to a government computer system. 52 For the individual
computer user, the only potentially applicable claim, and also the most
43

Id. at 1007. Perhaps the difference in the two cases can be understood from
looking further at the facts of these cases. In White, the case concerned viewing
e-mails showing an extramarital affair, whereas Remsburg concerned the
stalking and murder of a woman.
44
See infra notes 57-62, 69-73 and accompanying text, for the treatment of
implied consent.
45
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
46
Id. §§ 2701, 2707 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
47
Id. § 2511 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
48
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. 2004).
49
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2004).
50
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B))iii) (Supp. 2004).
51
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(iv) (Supp. 2004).
52
Id. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(v) (Supp. 2004).
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difficult to establish, is the aggregate of $5,000 in damage. Even the most
expensive personal computer costs much less than this. 53 An alternative
possibility would be for the individual to claim the loss of personal data
exceeding the $5,000 limit. 54 The question this raises for the individual
consumer is whether litigation and the necessity of experts to show the
extent of loss are worth the chance of recovery. 55 For the individual
consumer, without a class action, the potential value of CFAA disappears.
Furthermore, even if a class action arises, at least one of the members of the
class must have $5,000 worth of damages to allow the other class members’
claims to survive. 56 The damage threshold eliminates CFAA as an avenue
of redress for most consumers.
¶17
Businesses and corporations with large networks and expensive
machines are the best candidates to succeed under the CFAA. Such entities
are most likely to have losses exceeding the $5,000 minimum. However,
businesses have a different but equally daunting problem under the CFAA:
authorization. 57 The CFAA specifically states that only if unauthorized
access is used “to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accessor is not entitled so to obtain or alter” 58 will liability exist. Spyware
programs almost always obtain the end-user’s “consent,” somewhere during
the installation procedure and usually in some hidden manner, thus making
the CFAA a marginally useful tool to combat spyware even when the victim
has sufficient damage.
¶18
Further complicating this issue is the inconsistency among courts.
For example, the court in Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp. held
that parties are not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which
they are unaware of or contained in documents whose contractual nature is
not obvious. 59 In Netscape, the Second Circuit, applying California law,
53

See, for example, the Dell Inspiron XPS, a gaming notebook computer priced
at $2,828 at www.dell.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). Gaming computers,
because of their advanced graphics and other attributes, are among the most
expensive.
54
See, for example, Stephanie Byers, Internet: Privacy Lost, Identities Stolen,
40 BRANDEIS L.J. 141 (Fall 2001), for a description of losses due to identity
theft and the potential liability of those stealing the information.
55
This assumes the spyware perpetrator can be found and has not disappeared
into cyberspace.
56
See Thurmond v. Compaq Computer Corp., 171 F. Supp. 2d 667, 681 (E.D.
Tex. 2001) (holding that at least one protected computer must have an aggregate
of over $5,000 in damage for a class to be certified). Once the class can find
one protected computer, all injured class members may bring their claims, even
if their individual damages are less than $5,000. Id.
57
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
58
Id.
59
306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002) (applying California law).
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held that “a consumer’s clicking on a download button does not
communicate assent to contractual terms if the offer did not make clear to
the consumer that clicking on the download button would signify assent to
those terms.” 60
¶19
In a diametrically opposed case, i.Lan Systems, Inc. v. Netscout
Service Level Corp., the federal district court in Massachusetts held that
simply clicking on the “I Agree” box was an appropriate way to form a
contract. 61 Therefore, when a spyware company buries its contractual
provisions inside a boilerplate that an end-user is unlikely to read, the
CFAA may become useless because of the consent exemption. On the other
hand, since spyware programs frequently do not disclose their software’s
capabilities with sufficient detail, victims can argue that the spyware
activities exceed the authorization. However, as the law stands currently,
victims must hope their court follows the Netscape reasoning.

B. Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional
Records Act (“Stored Communications Act”)
¶20
Since it could be argued that spyware collects personal information
from an individual through a communication without that individual’s

60

Id.
183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D. Mass. 2002). See also ProCD, Inc., v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining that under U.C.C. §
2-204, vendor, as master of offer, may propose limitations on kind of conduct
that constitutes acceptance; § 2-207 does not apply in case with only one form);
M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 311-14
(Wash. 2000) (holding that where vendor and purchaser utilized license
agreement in prior course of dealing, shrink-wrap license agreement constituted
issue of contract formation under § 2-204, not contract alteration under § 2-207).
But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000)
(holding that because plaintiff is not a merchant, additional or different terms
contained in the Standard Terms did not become part of the parties’ agreement
unless plaintiff expressly agreed to them); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse
Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 98 (3d Cir. 1991) (explaining that parties’ conduct in
shipping, receiving and paying for product demonstrates existence of contract;
box top license constitutes proposal for additional terms under § 2-207 which
requires express agreement by purchaser); Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software
Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993) (explaining that vendor
entered into contract by agreeing to ship goods, or at latest by shipping goods to
buyer; license agreement constitutes proposal to modify agreement under § 2209 which requires express assent by buyer); and U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1206 (D. Kan. 1998) (finding that sales contract
concluded when vendor received consumer orders; single-use language on
product’s label was proposed modification under § 2-209 which requires express
assent by purchaser).
61
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consent, spyware arguably violates the Stored Communications Act. 62 The
Act specifies a private cause of action to protect individuals in their
privacy. 63
The Stored Communications Act requires proof of five elements.
The access must: (1) be to “a facility through which an electronic
communication service is provided;” (2) be intentional; (3) exceed
authorization; (4) “obtain[], alter[], or prevent[]” a wire or electronic
communication; and (5) involve a communication maintained in electronic
storage in that system. 64
¶21

¶22
First, the court needs to determine whether the information resides
in “a facility through which an electronic communication service is
provided.” 65 This element is generally not a problem under the definition of
facility. 66 Spyware, by its very definition, uses an individual’s or a
business’ machine as a facility through which it can access electronic
information. Consequently, this element of the Stored Communications Act
does not raise problems.

The second element, intent, should also be easy to satisfy.67 Even if
a spyware manufacturer claims that some of the information mined from the
user’s computer and returned to the spyware company was mistakenly
collected, the spyware company certainly cannot claim that it did not
intentionally access information on the individual’s computer.
¶23

¶24
Once again, authorization may limit the utility of this statutory
remedy. 68 Will a court hold that “clicking through” the “I agree” included
in a lengthy boilerplate agreement demonstrates consent to the spyware’s
mining of data, or will it hold that actual informed and knowing consent is
62

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2000 & West Supp. 2005).
Id. § 2707. The civil cause of action allows equitable or declaratory relief, id.
§ 2707(b)(1), as well as attorneys’ fees, id. § 2707(b)(3), and compensatory
damages of no less than $1,000, id. § 2707(c). In the event the violation was
"willful or intentional, the court may assess punitive damages." Id.
64
Id. § 2701(a).
65
Id. § 2701(a)(1).
66
The Stored Communications Act adopts the definitions included in the
Wiretap Act. Id. § 2711(1) (Supp. 2004). Under the Wiretap Act, an “electronic
communication service” is defined as "any service which provides to users
thereof the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications." Id. §
2510(15). Under such a definition, an individual’s home computer qualifies as
an electronic communication service because it has the ability to send or receive
electronic communications.
67
See id. § 2701(a)(1).
68
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1) includes "without authorization" while 18 U.S.C. §
2701 includes "exceeds an authorization" both of which can be used by the
spyware company as a defense.
63
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required? 69 If courts require explicit authorization, spyware companies can
effectively nullify the requirement so long as courts allow them to bury the
notice in a lengthy document that no one will read [and probably designed
so no one ever could read it]. While many courts have held that mere use of
a product or purchase of a service is not sufficient to infer consent, 70 other
cases such as i.Lan Systems 71 allow spyware companies to circumvent this
element by burying boilerplate authorization in a “click through”
agreement. 72
¶25
The next element of the Stored Communications Act requires that
the spyware company access an “electronic communication.” 73 While it is
possible that spyware programs might operate solely on installed program
files on a host computer, it is extremely unlikely that the spyware could
avoid all end-user information that fits the definition of an electronic
communication. 74 So, litigants should have no trouble with this element.
¶26
The final element is equally easy to satisfy. This element requires
that information be “in electronic storage” 75 at the time it is accessed. Since
all spyware programs operate on host machines that have transformed input
into digital electronic information, spyware by definition must access
information in electronic storage at the time.

While there are some exceptions to the Stored Communications Act
concerning governmental subpoenas 76 and other types of authorization, 77

¶27

69

Some courts have found that although the interception of electronic
communications does not require explicit consent, consent can only be inferred
if the end-user has notice and actually gives informed consent. In re
Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003).
70
In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 20.
71
iLan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass.
2002).
72
As a District of Massachusetts court held, “To be sure, shrinkwrap and
clickwrap license agreements share the defect of any standardized contract –
they are susceptible to the inclusion of terms that border on the unconscionable
– but that is not the issue in this case. The only issue before the Court is
whether clickwrap license agreements are an appropriate way to form contracts,
and the Court holds they are. In short, i.Lan explicitly accepted the clickwrap
license agreement when it clicked on the box stating ‘I agree.’” Id. at 338.
73
18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2000).
74
Once again, the Stored Communications Act refers to the Wiretap Act for its
definition of electronic communication. In the Wiretap Act, electronic
communication includes any data transmitted “in whole or in part . . . affect[ing]
interstate or foreign commerce.” Id. § 2510(12). By its very definition, spyware
seeks to acquire such data and transmit electronically to the spyware company
for the benefit of a commercial enterprise.
75
Id. § 2701(a).
76
See id. §§ 2703(a), 2704(a) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
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the only impact of these exceptions would be with respect to the
authorization element described above. Consequently, as with the other
potential remedies, if “authorization” can be redefined, a remedy may exist.
This must be resolved legislatively since most of the litigation will rely
upon individual state contract laws. Only if a uniform law is enacted or if
Congress intervenes to make the law uniform for interstate communications
will some consistency occur.

C. The Wiretap Act
The Wiretap Act 78 would seem to be the best avenue to address
spyware. However, unlike the Stored Communications Act, courts have
limited its provisions to apply only to interception of electronic information
79
in transit.
The Wiretap Act was designed not to protect digital
80
communication but to protect telephone calls over traditional networks.
Spyware companies have taken advantage of the storage-transit dichotomy
to develop programs that intercept communications while they are in a
¶28

77

See id. § 2701(c)(1)-(2).
Id. § 2510 et seq. (2000 & Supp. 2004).
79
One of the main problems of the Wiretap Act is the storage—transit
dichotomy. Circuits that narrowly read the Wiretap Act require any interception
to be contemporaneous with transmission. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy
Litig., 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir 2003). Under this standard, it is possible for a
defendant to argue that there are two separate communications: one between the
end-user and the intended Web Portal, and the second between the end-user and
the spyware technology. See generally, Chance v. Avenue A, Inc., 165 F. Supp.
2d 1153, 1155-57 (W.D. Wash. 2001); In re DoubleClick Privacy Litig., 154 F.
Supp. 2d 497, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.3d at 12;
In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litig., No. M-00-1381 MMC, 2001 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 16947, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2001); In re Intuit Privacy Litig., 138 F. Supp. 2d
1272, 1274 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Under this argument, a spyware program becomes
a party to the conversation authorizing its interception of the data under the
Wiretap Act. See In re Pharmatrak, 329 F.3d at 19-22. Since the Wiretap Act
allows either party to consent to the recording a data communications, the
spyware program is not violating the Wiretap Act. This is permissible because
the Wiretap Act presupposes that both parties to the conversation had
knowledge that a conversation was in fact taking place. 18 U.S.C.A. §
2511(2)(d) (2000) (stating that a party may consent to the interception of only
part of a communication or to the interception of only a subset of its
communication). Here, the end-user can assert that he or she lacked such
knowledge and did not consent to the communication, but unfortunately, the law
has precluded the end-user from asserting that the transmission occurred without
their consent. Id.
80
See generally Daniel B. Garrie, Mathew J. Armstrong & Alan F. Blakley
Voice Over Internet Protocol: Reality v. Legal Fiction, FED. LAW. Aug. 2005,
at 7, 34.
78
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81

temporarily stored state, therefore not being transmitted. Spyware has
achieved the ability of bypassing the Wiretap Act in a two-step process.
First, it has been designed to record individual user’s keystrokes or other
82
data input actions.
Then in the next step, the spyware transmits the
83
information to the spyware’s creator. As the Central District of California
said in United States v. Ropp, spyware companies that have taken advantage
of the confusion generated by the storage-transit dichotomy have gotten
84
away with accessing data in spite of the Wiretap Act. The Wiretap Act
can still be used in limited situations where information is recorded during
real time communication. Furthermore, as discussed below, the government
may prosecute manufacturing, advertising, and selling a tool for use to
85
intercept live real time communications.
¶29
The government recently tried to approach spyware from a slightly
different perspective that may provide some relief under the Wiretap Act for
86
In Perez-Melara, the defendant
the most egregious perpetrators.
87
allegedly created and marketed a program called Loverspy to monitor the
88
on-line behavior of suspected unfaithful spouses. The defendant sold the
progam to individuals to “monitor, record and report all electronic mails,
passwords, chat sessions, instant messages and websites visited by any user
89
of the victim computer.”
The manufacturer and seller allowed the
purchaser of the software to send a Loverspy greeting card through e-mail

81

Id. For a more in-depth analysis, see Daniel B. Garrie, Mathew J. Armstrong,
& Donald P. Harris, Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your
Conversation Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 95 (Fall 2005).
82
Such interception has been held not to violate the act because the information
was intercepted prior to its transmission. Unites States v. Ropp, 347 F. Supp. 2d
831, 837 (C.D. Cal. 2004). The court there held that "although defendant
engaged in a gross invasion of privacy by his installation of the KeyKatcher on
Ms. Beck’s computer, his conduct did not violate the Wiretap Act. While this
may be unfortunate, only Congress can cover bases untouched." Id. at 838.
83
For the differences between adware and spyware, see supra note 16.
84
347 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
85
The Wiretap Act, like the Stored Communications Act, authorizes recovery of
civil damages for persons whose communications are intercepted in violation of
the act. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000) (concerning damages, including punitive
damages, and attorneys’ fees).
86
See United States v. Perez-Melara, No. 05 CR 1264LAB, 2005 WL 2173087
(S.D. Cal. July 21, 2005); Jason Schossler, "Spyware Creator Facing Up to 175
Years in Prison," ANDREWS COMPUTER AND INTERNET LITIG. REP., Sept. 20,
2005, at 10.
87
Perez-Melara, 2005 WL 2173087 at Count 1.
88
Id. at ¶ 2.
89
Id.
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90

to the victim. When the victim opened the seemingly innocuous greeting
card sent from a spouse or friend, it installed a spyware application in the
victim’s computer to report use information back to the “electronic mail
91
address of the purchaser.”
¶30
The government charged the creator of this spyware with
manufacturing, advertising, and promoting interception devices in violation
92
of the Wiretap Act. Perhaps this use of the Wiretap Act, targeting the
manufacturer of spyware, will lead to an effective use of that law in at least
some situations.

IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION
¶31
While all of the potential liability described above may provide
assistance for some consumers and businesses in the right court and under
the right circumstances, most spyware has been able to bypass any criminal
and civil liability. The best solution to the problem, that would not have the
side-effect of prohibiting the legitimate business of Internet companies,
would be nationwide legislation through an act of the United States
Congress requiring any entity doing business in the United States to acquire
express authorization and informed consent to the specific access being
93
granted anytime someone places an application on another’s computer.

As a start, the legislation could require that any site that will install
an application onto the other user’s computer must have clear and explicit
warnings in plain English enabling the user to understand exactly what the
application will do, including the information it will gather, who will
receive the information, how it will be used and any potential modifications
of the user’s system the application will cause. “Click-Through” and EndUser License Agreements or authorizations are not acceptable. First, the
agreement must begin with a conspicuous statement that by accepting the
terms, the user is authorizing outside access to the user’s information.
Perhaps examples of the information to be collected and mined would be
included. Then the authorization, or End-User’s License Agreement, would
have a series of simple statements and the recipient would need to agree
with each one. In any event, each and every result of the installation of the
application must be specifically disclosed and accepted by the end-user.
¶32

90

Id. at ¶ 5.
Id. at ¶ 6.
92
18 U.S.C. § 2512(1) (2000 & Supp. 2004).
93
This could be accomplished by an amendment to the Stored Communications
Act because unlike the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, it does not have a
minimum damage requirement. Furthermore, by requiring such authorization
and consent for any person or entity doing business in the United States, the
problem of monitoring international compliance is limited.
91
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Finally, the legislation must have statutory penalties so the consumer need
not prove specific damages.

CONCLUSION
¶33
The existing theories of liability do not provide adequate remedies
either for consumers or for businesses. The major problem is the
inconsistent definition of “authorization.” Simply defining “authorization”
by statute is not enough. Congress must be careful to define spyware in
such a way that legitimate Internet businesses using cookie technology can
continue to operate while at the same time eliminating implicit acceptance
and authorization and requiring, as with all other consumer protection laws,
that such authorization be explicit, fully informed and in simple,
CONSPICUOUS language. Congress can act to eliminate this dangerous
and growing threat to individual privacy and to legitimate business. Due to
inconsistent state law and judicial interpretations, the remedy must be
statutory, and it must be national.

